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Abstract  
 
Knowledge sharing typically examines organizational transfer of knowledge, often from 
headquarters to subsidiaries, from developed country sites to emerging country sites, or from 
host to local employees.  Yes, recent research, such as Prahalad’s Bottom of the Pyramid, 
raises the question of reverse transfer of knowledge, or whether knowledge could and should 
be transferred from local sites to home country sites within an organization.  As several 
emerging economies build their capabilities in knowledge, research and development, 
marketing, and the like, it only makes sense to consider what type of knowledge and how to 
transfer it in reverse or bi-directional manners.   
 
This reflection paper takes one step back in the process.  Rather than focusing on what 
knowledge transfer may make sense within an organization, we consider, through a series of 
small case studies and experience, what types of knowledge are important for foreigners to 
know at the initial stages of engagement abroad as they consider whether to do business in an 
emerging country.   
 
Knowledge sharing has traditionally referred to within organizational transfer of knowledge, often from 
headquarters to subsidiaries, from developed country sites to emerging country sites, or from host to local 
employees.  Recent research has sought to consider human resource management and knowledge transfer may be 
changing in fast paced environments, particularly in emerging economies (e.g.,  Harvey, Kiessling, and Novicevic, 
2003;  Miesing, Kriger, and Slough, 2007; Napier, 2005, 2006; Prahalad,2004) raise the question of  reverse transfer 
of knowledge, or whether knowledge could and should be transferred from local sites to home country sites within 
an organization.  As several emerging economies build their capabilities in knowledge, research and development, 
marketing, and the like, it only makes sense to consider what type of knowledge and how to transfer it in reverse or 
bi-directional manners (Napier, Harvey and Usui, 2008).   
 
This paper takes one step back in the process.  Rather than focusing on what knowledge transfer may make sense 
within an organization, we offer observations about selected types of knowledge that would be important for 
foreigners to know at the initial stages of engagement abroad as they consider whether to do business in an emerging 
country.   Much research has focused on what cultural aspects foreigners need to know before leaving for an 
assignment abroad (e.g., Vance and Paik, 2002; ) working abroad focuses on what training they need before 
 
For this paper, Vietnam is the country of focus for several reasons.  First, it is one of the fastest growing investment 
destinations in the world.  According to a survey of global investors by UK Trade and Investment and the Economist 
Intelligence unit, for the third year in a row, Vietnam was rated the top investment location after the BRIC countries. 
(http://www.ukti.gov.uk/uktihome/media/pressRelease/117708.html).  The more than 520 global executives who 
were surveyed ranked Vietnam as the #2 investment destination after China for the coming two years.  In addition, 
the survey also notes that local companies in those emerging countries are key for global firms seeking partnerships 
and alliances, meaning that the demand for local knowledge is crucial for success.  Also, academic research has 
begun to blossom on Vietnam in recent years (e.g., Giroud, 2007; Napier and Thomas, 2004; Quang, Swierczek, and 
Chi, 1998; Vo, 2009).   
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In addition to these reasons for examining the conditions in Vietnam, the authors also bring unique expertise.  One is 
a Vietnamese business manager/entrepreneur and consultant who has extensive experience working with local and 
foreign firms.  As a result, he has worked with many foreigners in a variety of business fields.  During those years, 
he has encountered many knowledge gaps in people who seek to do business in his country.  The other author is an 
American, who has worked in Vietnam since 1994 in educational and business sectors, and has written and 
examined notions of reverse and bi-directional knowledge transfer within organizations.  Thus, both of us have 
experience on the past and current business conditions of this fast paced emerging economy, and of how to transfer 
knowledge both directions.  This paper, however, has pushed us to think very practically about the types of 
knowledge important for foreigners to understand as they engage with potential Vietnamese business partners.   
 
Finally, research on what foreigners and expatriates need to know before and during their time in a host country 
(e.g., Bjorkman and Ehrnrooth, 1999; Napier and Thomas, 2004; Thomas and Ravlin, 1995; Vance and Paik, 2005) 
often takes the foreigner’s perspective.  Less research (e.g., Vance and Paik, 2002; Vo, 2009) looks at what the host 
country employees might need or be able to teach expatriates.  This paper, then, offers suggestions, based primarily 
upon in country experience, case examples of successes and failures to look at what information may be available 
and useful coming from within an emerging country.  Given its more macro focus, the paper moves beyond what 
cross-cultural management researchers would typically focus on – learning and understanding cultural differences – 
to business aspects, which of course embed culture as well.   
 
Doing Business in Vietnam: Oh, if Only Those Foreigners Understood…. 
 
In this section of the paper, we examine five broad areas where Vietnamese business people frequently bemoan the 
fact that foreigners do not quite understand the local conditions when they seek to do business in the country.  In 
particular, the selected areas focus on understanding (1) the notion of who does what and “seed capital;” (2) 
“disguised entrepreneurs;”  (3) strategic planning and consultants; and (4) different perspectives on human resource 
management; and (5) the role of strategic partners.   As Granted, several of these observations are not unique to 
Vietnam but are common across emerging economies generally. Yet, if they are relatively common, experience in 
Vietnam then offers the opportunity to look at some macro issues that any foreign manager in an emerging economy 
may face.  Of course, some aspects are Vietnam-specific, because of history or cultural influences, and we point 
those out within the segments below. 
 
Vietnam’s history is long, complex, and can be confusing to foreigners.  Key elements, though, can help potential 
businesspeople who wish to do business with the Vietnamese.  First, the people have been influenced by a 
Confucian culture, including the importance of hierarchy and saving face, by a history that has included long 
stretches of being invaded by others, leading to some distrust by outsiders.  Indeed, the last 35 years has been one of 
the country’s longest periods without war.  Finally, the differences between the north and south, in terms of the view 
of money, savings, and entrepreneurship all affect the interaction between business people in Vietnam and 
foreigners.   
 
Understanding who does what and “seed” capital 
 
Most Vietnamese business people are enthusiastic about discussing collaboration opportunities. Their over-
enthusiasm, however, sometimes leads to their partners’ misunderstanding, especially when the partners are 
foreigners. Many Vietnamese people have a perception that foreigners bring not only future profits but also 
immediate revenues.  If a foreigner overlooks this expectation for quick returns and revenue, then the highly 
potential collaboration may stumble or perhaps evaporate all together.  So why the misunderstanding?  
 
A foreigner who comes to Vietnam is pleased when he finds what he considers to be the right local counterpart who 
well understands the local market. The foreigner is happy to learn market insights from his partner, which typically 
happens verbally at meetings and dinners. However, there comes the time when the foreign investor needs concrete 
facts and figures to develop a careful business plan for the new venture into Vietnam’s market. Since he considers 
the business plan as a prerequisite for mutual benefits, the foreigner often expects his Vietnamese partner to provide 
such information and data.  In other words, the foreigners often expect that the local partners will conduct market 
research (often at no cost) as part of what they bring to the budding relationship.   The Vietnamese business people 
typically do not think this is appropriate but, for cultural reasons, they rarely ask for payment.  Sometimes they 
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expect that the foreigner will offer (some payment) but when he does not, thus comes the first opportunity for 
misunderstandings and chance for a lost partnership.    
 
The typical scenario is that the foreign partner expects the Vietnamese partner to conduct marketing research as well 
as other tasks, like checking legal questions or arranging key meetings, as part of the contribution to the new 
relationship.  While foreigner may not expect that the Vietnamese partner will cover ALL the costs in this 
preparation stage, he very likely will consider many of the tasks as part of a “joint venture,” and thus anticipate that 
the Vietnamese side will cover the costs incurred in Vietnam, at a minimum.  The foreigner, for his part, expects to 
take responsibility for tasks and costs that happen outside of Vietnam.  Given that quid pro quo expectation on the 
foreigner’s part, he misses the undercurrent resentment.   At base, the Vietnamese partner may simply consider the 
costs, from his perspective, to be too high in relative terms.  Also, the Vietnamese may wish (expect?) the foreigner 
to offer some immediate (even if small) revenues to the partnership, by paying for some of the onsite work.  If that 
happens, the Vietnamese consider it as signal of goodwill and serious collaboration.  
 
So what’s behind this?  The Vietnamese partner has knowledge of the local market and considers that knowledge to 
be an asset for the potential partnership (Nguyen, Giang, and Napier, 2001).   But because conducting thorough 
market research or initiating a new business incurs expenses, he will be reluctant to do too much without some 
financial incentive.  Thus, on the one hand, the Vietnamese partner wants to capitalize on this knowledge asset and 
feel it has financial value to the foreign partner.   Also, since the Vietnamese partner may perceive that he faces 
above-average expenses when entering a foreign partnership, both in form and substance, he will wish for some 
upfront support.  At a minimum, the Vietnamese partner expects the foreign partner to cover or at least share the 
costs associated with marketing research.  When they calculate what the foreigner is already spending to look at 
opportunities in Vietnam, the Vietnamese business partner then becomes frustrated.  That is, the Vietnamese partner 
calculates that the foreigner spends more on his airfares, hotels, and food than what it would cost in Vietnam to pay 
for collecting information, gathering important contacts, exploring legal procedures, and the like.  But if the 
foreigner does not offer to pay, and the Vietnamese is saving face by not asking for pay, no one mentions the issue 
directly.  This stems from a long term cultural influence in Vietnam, in which hierarchy plays in stronger, placing 
the Vietnamese at a somewhat vulnerable position relative to what he may perceive as the more powerful foreigner 
in the relationship (Vu and Napier, 2000).    The disappointing and baffling result:  the foreigner waits for 
Vietnamese inputs while the Vietnamese waits for financial support.  Cooperation stalls, and often the foreigner has 
no idea why.   
 
To avoid this situation, the foreigner should proactively ask his partner about cost-sharing policies. Because many 
Vietnamese businesses are frequently in short financial positions, they will appreciate it greatly if the foreign partner 
helps support the upfront activities.  Sometimes, the burden can often be relieved by a surprisingly small amount of 
“seed capital” funding to begin a fruitful business and partnership.  Thus, before pursuing and acknowledging a full 
partnership, a wise foreign investor may appoint his Vietnamese counterpart as a liaison or representative office, and 
help fund the operation’s expenses to conduct initial steps.  This option truly ensures the mutual benefits. 
 
In addition to understanding the financial expectations and obligations on both sides, the foreigner needs to 
understand fully the role of the potential partner.  This ties in with the next section, where we discuss the idea of a 
“disguised entrepreneur,” or “middle man.”  Critical in choosing a partner at any stage is the importance of finding 
out what the partner can and will do.  Many Vietnamese business people will approach a foreigner with ideas for 
investment and collaboration.  Oftentimes flattered, the foreigner without much understanding may “fall for” what 
sounds like an unusually lucrative opportunity.   The foreigner should always find out what the potential partner has 
completed and how he has followed through on other projects.  Often there is a gap between what the local partner 
proposes what he has done or is able to do.   Thus, it is critical for the foreigner to find some type of trustworthy 
“cultural or business interpreter,” who can help deconstruct the reality.   
 
The “cultural interpreter” should be a local professional business and consulting firm, which has an understanding 
and expertise of the business and administrative processes, freeing the foreigner from some of the paperwork 
burden.  The knowledge and skill of the consultant in Vietnam comes in knowing the right person in the 
administration who is in charge of some procedures (e.g., issuing an investment license) as well as how to build a 
relationship with him (or her). This type of consulting business is now maturing in Vietnam since public 
administration reform program is progressing.  
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Understanding the “disguised entrepreneur” or “middle man” role 
 
Most Vietnamese businesses are small and medium enterprises, a fact that is often used as an evidence of strong and 
dynamic entrepreneurship in Vietnam.  But there is also a vibrant group of so-called “disguised entrepreneurs.”   
 
When a foreigner comes to Vietnam, her Vietnamese counterpart may persuade her that “this” is the right time to go 
after an opportunity and set up a business firm in the emerging market.  Assuming the potential foreign partner 
understands the need for initial financial support to conduct market studies, and assuming the economic environment 
looks promising, a specific project or business may emerge as a possible opportunity.    But after the initial period, 
when the Vietnamese counterpart turns to the foreigner and says, “NOW it is time for partner selection,” no wonder 
the foreigner is perplexed.  Sometimes the foreigner may feel she is being “handed off” or that the initial 
relationship was not transparent.  Yet, it is more a case of different business practices, than underhanded actions.   
 
So why such a shift at this stage?  Rather than assuming that the initial “partner” will be the long term partner, which 
may be the case in other countries, the Vietnamese approach the process differently.  Instead of the “first” 
Vietnamese counterpart being the eventual partner, in fact, that person will want to introduce other local candidates 
who are more suitable as partners for the long term project or specific business opportunity.  Behind this is a 
preference that many Vietnamese business people have to being a “middle man” rather than to being the primary 
partner on a project or new business venture.  These middle men, who make connections for entrepreneurial 
ventures are called, in Vietnam, “disguised entrepreneurs.”    They favor being on the “safe side” – just making 
connections – rather than taking overt financial risks or facing other uncertainties, even if they forgo possible profits.  
 
The benefits for these disguised entrepreneurs who assist foreigners in selecting the “real” partners are many.  First, 
they gain immediate revenues by facilitating the discussion and negotiation process. To this end, however, it is 
important to understand the distinction between these “disguised entrepreneurs” and professional service providers, 
namely consulting firms.   The disguised entrepreneurs seek not only financial but also intangible gains.  The 
intangible gains are business relationships that may extend to future business opportunities and branding effects. The 
Vietnamese middle man needs a good reason to approach the other potential partners, especially the bigger or 
stronger Vietnamese corporations. Thus, introducing a high-profile international counterpart to a large Vietnamese 
firm builds the disguised entrepreneur’s brand and credibility.  This process of facilitating partners “finding” each 
other allows the middle man to expand his business relations.  In addition, if he does a good job for the international 
counterpart in seeking local partners, he will likewise expand his own “international” brand.    
 
Second, since the disguised entrepreneurs are involved in the project at its initial stage, they may contribute many 
ideas to the future business, even though they will not be involved in the implementation of those ideas.  Thus, they 
gain status (and intrinsic satisfaction) in being listened to but also in seeing, over time, some of their ideas or dreams 
become true, and they do this without taking the risks involved in making those ideas happen.    Finally, some argue 
that the disguised entrepreneurs feel more respected simply by being part of the early discussions with foreigners.  
Although his business is small, and his resources are very limited, the middle man often can bring an abundance of 
business ideas. (In fact, one of his problems may be having too many good ideas.)  In most cases, this disguised 
entrepreneur wants to implement these ideas but, because of his unwillingness to take risks or the lack of financial 
resources, he cannot or does not.   Thus, by offering ideas to the foreign investor, he has the opportunity to see some 
of the ideas implemented.  This makes for a schizophrenic position at times: on the one hand, the middle man wants 
to claim some ownership of the business ideas he proposes; conversely, however, he is risk adverse when it comes to 
implementing those concepts.   
 
Despite this perhaps confusing state for the foreign partner, a Vietnamese middle man partner is useful for the 
foreigner because he is willing to facilitate the success of the new business or project without expecting major 
financial returns.  However, because the middle man typically lacks professional capacities to support investment 
facilitations, he may feel left “out of the game.”  And this conjures up yet another danger spot for the foreign 
investor.  If the middle man feels threatened (i.e., that the foreign investor naturally begins to listen to the new “non-
disguised” partner, the middle man may react in negative ways.   While he may sincerely wish and seek to find a 
very good Vietnamese partner for the foreign investor, he nevertheless wishes to continue in a significant role for the 
foreigner and may fear that the new Vietnamese partner will (appear to or) be perceived by the foreigner as much 
better than he is.  As most outsiders would fully expect, the strength of the new partner may reduce the perceived 
value of the middle man.   In some cases, and not all that infrequently according to Vietnamese partners and 
  
5 
 
This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article.  The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at 
International Journal of Human Resources Development and Management, published by Inderscience. Copyright restrictions may apply.  
DOI: 10.1504/IJHRDM.2011.041672 
consultants, the middle man may seek to maintain a strong role by pointing out weaknesses and disadvantages of the 
very partner he has recommended to the foreigner.  From the foreigner point of view, this can be disconcerting and 
confusing at the very least, and perhaps even frustrating enough to want to pull completely away from the middle 
man.  Yet, Vietnamese experts argue that at this stage, the middle man could indeed do serious damage so the best 
tactic for the foreigner is to repeatedly affirm that the middle man is still an important member of the team.   
  
Understanding Strategic Planning and the Use of Consultants 
 
The notions of corporate strategy and long-term planning are somewhat new in Vietnam, and hence strange and 
unrealistic, to much of the business community there.   Coupled with the expense of conducting long term planning 
projects, many Vietnamese business people eschew the idea of using outsiders at all.  Yet, many managers set up 
and start running a new company with a list of wishes but with no business plan. Recently, some large corporations 
in Vietnam have embraced the concept of doing “big things,” thinking globally, and developing strategy. These are 
positive signals that the local business society is stronger and integrating well into global business and systems. 
However, it is unclear whether these corporations are truly aware of their needs and what it means to have a 
thoughtful business strategy.  
 
As with so much in Vietnam, what appears to foreigners on the surface to be a positive market may underneath be 
something quite different.  The misunderstandings often come when the expectations of  the parties differ 
significantly and the foreign consultant or professional firm is unable to get to the true reason for an engagement. 
The most common reason for hiring foreign consultants appears repeatedly – to have the  cache of the international 
brand involved with the firm.  This, of course, often means that the content and the results from the foreign 
consultant work is less important.   
 
Yet, foreign professionals and consultants can find a huge market for strategic management consultancy in Vietnam, 
and surprisingly, often very generous budgets for such projects.  Multi-million dollar contracts for corporate 
restructuring and/or strategic planning are increasingly popular.   For example, in 2010, VIB Bank signed a multi-
million dollar consulting contract with the Boston Consulting Group.   
 
Interestingly, however, some of the Vietnamese business people who pay high prices for foreign consultants seem 
relatively unconcerned about the quality of services.  At present, the focus is more on gaining the notoriety and 
recognition that comes from engaging the services of a well-known international team of consultants with high 
brand recognition, including some well-known experts or professors.  Gaining the recognition, for some Vietnamese 
corporations, appears to be far more important than the exorbitant fees demanded by the international consultants.   
 
Although such an environment sounds like heaven for a foreign consulting firm seeking to do business in Vietnam, 
as always, consultants need to be aware of the unseen and likely unmentioned expectations of such programs.  The 
most important rule to remember in the current strategic planning consulting environment in Vietnam is that the 
business owner very likely has already set his own strategy and ideas, and the consultant’s job is to describe those 
(perhaps unwritten) plans professionally, internationally, and globally.   In other words, rather than create a good 
strategy for the firm, the consultant’s job in reality is to support the owner’s ex-ante strategy.  Thus, 
misunderstandings sometimes occur.  
 
For example, a Vietnamese business owner may request a foreign consulting firm to conduct a feasibility study on 
factory expansion. A service contract is prepared by both sides, and the relationship appears friendly and 
cooperative. However, early on, the two parties disagree on the definition of how to measure the accomplishment of 
the project’s mission. The foreigner defines accomplishment and completion as the submission of a feasibility report 
that is approved by the business owner. In the report, the foreign consultant expects to provide a recommendation of 
whether the Vietnamese firm should expand the factory or not.   The business owner, on the other hand, considers 
the project’s mission complete when shareholders agree on the expansion plan of the factory (regardless of the 
consultant’s recommendations to expand or not) and expects a much more extensive involvement from the 
consultant in helping to “sell” the shareholders on the expansion, which may in fact go against the consultant’s 
recommendation.   Thus foreigners, especially consultants, need to understand that a challenge in providing 
consulting services in Vietnam is not pricing services or showing clients how cleverly the consultant analyzed the 
problem, but to understand whether the clients have their own solutions before the project even begins, and what 
that could mean for the project’s success.   This, of course, is not only common in Vietnam but also in developed 
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countries, among a wide range of firms that hire consultants.  Yet, once again, the consultant needs to understand the 
“real” reasons behind a Vietnamese firm’s request for services.   
 
Understanding different perspectives and roles of “human resource management”  
 
A foreigner may also face confusion about human resource management issues that seem different from the ways 
they may be approached in her home country.  Examples follow.   
 
Employees may lack the ability to conduct cost-benefit analysis, even for themselves. When assigning an employee 
to a job, a human resource (HR) manager obviously wants to find the right match of skills and job, but also seeks 
someone who wants to hold the position. In other words, the best situation is to find an employee who is self-
motivated to do a good job, perhaps because it fulfills a personal goals.  Some people argue that Vietnamese people 
lack an ability to carry out cost-benefit analysis in their decision making, whether when choosing a job or assessing 
a business opportunity.   Perhaps because in the past, many employees have not been required to make decisions, but 
rather have been “told what to do,” at home, school, and at work, they may be unable to fully assess the benefits (or 
costs) of a new job when offered.  Thus, sometimes a foreigner may offer a position but find the Vietnamese 
recipient hesitant or uncertain about how to analyze the opportunity, let alone make a decision.   In such a situation, 
the Vietnamese HR manager, or perhaps even the CEO, must explain to the employee the benefits – and the 
drawbacks -- of a job.  Thus, instead of being a referee of the competition for the position, the HR manager or CEO 
may become more of a “salesperson” and negotiator with prospective employees.    
 
Further, since Vietnamese perceive that foreign firms tend to offer high salaries, have nice facilities (e.g., computers, 
air conditioning, pleasant surroundings), and a professional working environment, recruiting local Vietnamese staff 
members can be relatively easy for foreigners.  The applicants mostly think of benefits, not costs, when applying to 
a foreign firm.  Thus, the senior managers need to be sure the costs or drawbacks are considered, to make the 
decision for the employee one that is based upon “reality.”  This weak ability to assess costs and benefits can, of 
course, be a real problem at higher level jobs, especially when foreigners seek Vietnamese for mid-management 
positions.  Since those will inherently require an ability to carry out independent cost-benefit analysis in decision 
making, as well as some strategic vision, foreigners may need to build in training to help employees learn the skill.  
 
Short-sightedness.   A weak ability to do cost-benefit analysis may go along with short-sighted thinking, which can 
translate into frequent employee turnover.  A human resources manager may experience high levels of “people-in 
and people-out,” disrupting any hope of a stable work force.   This pattern is new to  Vietnam, a country where 
simply having a job, and staying with it regardless of conditions, was the accepted pattern for years.   
 
While foreigners may encounter similar upheaval in the home country, it seems especially strong in Vietnam at 
present, in part because of some of the other comments we referred to above (e.g., desire for quick returns, building 
brand image, using international / foreign partners as a way to gain status).  The same is likely true about some 
Vietnamese employees.  In addition, young Vietnamese talent increasingly expect that after several years of training 
on job, they will receive the mantle of management and demand more benefits.  Not unlike the Millennial 
Generation in the U.S., the younger employees begin demanding higher benefits “now, immediately.”  When the 
expected benefits are not forthcoming, they leave for a competitor, potentially kicking off a “labor war,” making 
doing business in Vietnam more costly.  Such a result, of course, is no good for the foreign firms or the Vietnamese 
economy.  
 
Perception of team-work and professionalism. The Vietnamese perceive team-work and professionalism differently 
than Western people.  While foreigners who have read about the “collective” culture assume that Vietnamese work 
well in groups, there is a definite distinction between group and team.  In fact, one often used phrase is that the 
Vietnamese are “groups called teams”  (Vu and Napier, 2000).  Teamwork, for Vietnamese, is dividing the work 
into different parts and every team member does his or her part separately, with limited coordination. There is, of 
course, a team leader who is in charge of collecting individual results and merging them, but the individual members 
work in parallel with no sense of working together toward a common goal. Therefore, foreigners need to be aware, 
even if they have highly qualified individual staff members, there will likely be a lack of “natural” teamwork and 
may need to explicitly develop that skill within the firm.   
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As to professionalism, some Vietnamese perceive and value form over the substance. A “professional” is person 
who wears suit, uses a modern laptop, speaks a foreign language, sits in high-rise building, and drives a car.  Rather 
such skills as writing an email with correct grammar, preparing meeting documents to be flawless, or presenting an 
attractive power-point overview, are considered less important than what may be accepted as common expectations 
in a foreign context.  Therefore, a foreigner should pay much more attention to what people really do than what they 
show. A Vietnamese may truly believe in his professionalism because he has a new Sony Vaio, but he may use it 
more for chatting, watching online movies and playing games than for work related activities. 
 
Skill and behavior at work.   Despite what may seem like deficiencies in the Vietnamese workforce, the people are 
quite smart and good learners. So when recruiting staff members, foreigners should worry less about applicants’ 
skills, which can be trained, than about their ways of thinking -- their jobs, their work, and their colleagues.  Some 
Vietnamese hear foreigners lament that they have tried their best to find good employees but then, metaphorically, 
throw up their hands and ask: “can they think correctly?” or even worse, “can they think?”   While good operational 
and human resource management guidelines may help, most important is seeking and finding employees who are 
willing and able to take responsibility, accountability and have ”good thinking capacity” – no different from what 
they desire in their home countries, but perhaps a bit harder to “see” clearly in another culture.     
 
Understanding the Role of Strategic Partners   
 
Many Vietnamese business people longingly remember the stock mania of 2006-2008.   The Vietnamese Index 
(VNIndex) rocketed from 503 points on March 3, 2006, to the peak of 1,171 on March 12, 2007. While flocking into 
stock transactions, the Vietnamese – like so many others around the world -- fully believed in the rising trend of 
stock prices (Vuong, 2010).  So, given the fast pace of mergers, acquisitions, or alliances, and the interest of 
foreigners in entering Vietnam, it is critical to understand just what the role is for those foreign strategic partners.   
 
The surge of the Vietnamese stock markets caused a second wave of foreign portfolio investment to Vietnam. In 
2006-2008, 20 new investment funds were initiated. The State Securities Commission of Vietnam also licensed 17 
fund management companies in the same period.  Essentially, such optimistic signs in the Vietnamese economic 
development buoyed the international financial community’s outlook on the country and its investment 
opportunities.    Large investment firms like Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, and J.P. Morgan Chase entered 
Vietnam (Vuong and Tran, 2009), anticipating a stable macro economic environment and active entrepreneurial 
community that would support Vietnam as a  destination for investment funds.   Like much of the rest of the world, 
it was a spectacular time for investing, and Vietnamese business people, like others, sought only to capitalize on 
their business successes.  Many Vietnamese firms and senior executives did just that.  Many top tier Vietnamese 
corporations went onto the stock markets, allowing, for example, a business owner to create fortune selling his 
equity after three months, rather than the normal ten years it would have taken earlier.   
 
Although many Vietnamese firms went public as the stock market boomed, before going public, most corporations 
sought strategic, usually international, partners.  The most sought after strategic partners were foreign investment 
funds, international financial institutions, and multinational corporations.  Such situations provide yet another place 
where the mismatch between what foreigners need to understand and what they think they know may cause 
problems when they seek to conduct business in a country like Vietnam.   
 
On the one hand, the foreign strategic partners bring to the potential collaboration significant financial resources, 
advanced technologies, and management knowledge. They offer what a local enterprise needs to transform into a 
regional and even international conglomerate. In addition, having international partnerships pushes the brand name 
of the Vietnamese corporation to a higher level, which results in increasing prices for the corporation’s equities.   
Also, in that heady period of the stock market growth, other more varied influences from outside the country flooded 
in, including a small Indian film called “Slumdog Millionaire.”  In a film-going Vietnam society, many saw the 
Indian movie and believed that if a “slumdog”  in India could become millionaire, so too should a Vietnamese 
business person be able to create a multi-million dollar business.  During that time, several stories of entrepreneurs 
in Vietnam emerged, further fueling the desire to grow fast.  Mr. Dang Le Nguyen Vu of Trung Nguyen Coffee (the 
“Starbucks of Vietnam) and Mr. Le Phuoc Vu of the Hoa Sen Group each started with “empty hands,” as so called 
“slumdogs,”  and built very large successful Vietnamese firms.  Thus, many Vietnamese came to believe that by 
providing successful entrepreneurs with more resources, they could create multi-million dollar businesses, which, of 
course, promised more jobs and opportunities for employment.  Because those resources include advanced 
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technology, management experience, access to international markets and capital, the foreign strategic partners were 
viewed as the gold mines to such growth.  To this end, Vietnamese corporations sought international strategic 
partnerships for their long-term development and prosperity.  
 
Understanding what “strategic partnerships” mean for Vietnamese, then is one of the most challenging issues that 
foreigners face.  Sometimes, a strategic partner is viewed as a person who shares a long-term business development 
plan and core values for building the organization.  Sometimes, a strategic partners is someone or an organization 
that a Vietnamese corporation needs in the short-term for branding or to generate higher equity prices. 
 
On the other hand, the Vietnamese corporations may not in fact need long-term strategic partnerships with 
foreigners as much as might initially appear to be the case.  Some Vietnamese CEO’s consider the involvement of a 
foreigner in the company’s board of management more as show than for true contribution Essentially, the 
Vietnamese firm may argue that the partnership is “good” if the stock prices rises; if it does not, then the partnership 
may be perceived as unnecessary.    
 
The lesson from this on-off thinking on the part of the Vietnamese is that a potential foreigner partner should try to 
get at the fundamental reasons and expectations for any strategic collaboration in Vietnam.  The case of FPT 
(Vietnam’s largest Internet provider and one of the largest software providers), Texas Pacific Group (TPG)/Intel 
Capital offers an example of a successful partnership.  The Vietnamese and American sides both enjoyed high 
profits when the price of FPT stock went up significantly in the first quarter of 2007.   Intel and TPG gained because 
they understood the game: they put money into FPT, waited until the “lock up” time expired (forbidding stock 
sales), then sold their stocks and made profit. They did not try to get involved in FPT’s management or stay with 
FPT for the long-term.   
 
Entrepreneurship has been critically important for both prosperity and sustainability of the  Vietnamese economy in 
the long-run. In fact, many Vietnamese business owners consider going public, listing their companies, and making 
strategic partnerships, acquisitions or mergers as a successful way to exit their business careers and move on. The 
2007-08 period was high season for mergers and acquisitions in Vietnam.  There were 51 acquisition and 59 merger 
transactions considered successful in 2007 and 2008, respectively, more than a half of all mergers and acquisitions 
from 1995 to 2009 (Vuong et.al.,  2010).  
 
Therefore, if a foreign partner is willing to provide a Vietnamese business owner with finance, technology, and 
management resources to make the business a further success – the foreigner needs to understand the goals of the 
Vietnamese entrepreneur.  For example, the Vietnamese partner may present high interest in expansion plans but, 
first and foremost, a portion of his business has to transform (very quickly) into cash. If it does not, the Vietnamese 
partner may soon exit, leaving the foreigner once again baffled, or worse.    
 
Final Observations  
 
Doing business in an emerging country like Vietnam is seductive for many foreigners.  The lure of huge potential 
gains in an economy with growth that far outpaces any western industrialized one, the optimism of the local business 
society, and the exotic cultures all can draw like a warn ocean.  Yet, not to carry the metaphor too far (!),below the 
enticing surface can be many riptides, unexpected currents, and perhaps even sharks.  Thus, the foreigner seeking to 
enter a country like Vietnam needs to push far further to understand what the situation is before moving forward.  
Our observations focus on several arenas in which foreigners may, in all of their open honesty and goodwill, simply 
misunderstand or misread a situation that could cause problems.  None of these conditions  assume that there is a 
concerted effort to scam or dupe a foreigner; they are simply “need to know” guidelines for reducing the expected 
bafflement that comes with entering a new country to do business.    
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